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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 34A-l-303(2)(b); 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(7); and 34A-2-801(8)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF VIEW 
Issue 1: Jenkins stated; "Whether the medical records exhibit was sufficiently exhaustive 
and properly relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission when 
denying Benson's request for permanent total disability benefits. 
My reply to this issue is included in the body of this Reply Brief. 
Standard of Review: 
Jenkins stated; "This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation 
and application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-1(H) which 
governs the form and creation of the medical records exhibit. 
My Reply to this statement is included in the body of this Reply Brief. The cases 
that Fve referenced as a standard are included in my original Brief. 
Issue 2: Jenkins stated; "Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor 
Commission abused their discretion by denying Benson's permanent total disability claim 
without submitting the question of causation to a medical panel. 
My reply to this issue is also in the body of this reply. 
Standard for Review: 
Jenkins stated; "This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation 
and application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-2 which governs 
the utilization of medical panels." 
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My Reply to this statement is also included in the body of this Reply Brief. The 
cases that Fve referenced as a standard are included in my original Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in Addendum 
A. Their citations are Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420(l); Utah 
Code Ann. 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-801; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-802(l); Utah 
Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(a) - changed to 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(9) -
changed to 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-8(2); Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-14; Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedures, Title II, Rule 11, (b)(1)(c); Utah Administrative Code 
R568-1-9 - changed to R602-2-2; Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(A4); Utah 
Administrative Code R602-2-l(A5); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(A6); Utah 
Administrative Code R602-2-l(Hl); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H2); Utah 
Administrative Code R602-2-l(H3); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H4); Utah 
Administrative Code R602-2-2. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I, the appellant, respectfully request that this court do two things. First, reverse 
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALP'), the Labor Commission ('the 
commission") and, the Commissioner. Secondly, give the final approval of my request 
for permanent total compensation benefits effective October 1,2000. 
REPLY - The Appellee in this case, Jenkins, would surely like this court to overlook 
the preponderance of substantial evidence that is more than sufficient to approve my 
request for permanent total disability compensation, like the ALJ, commission and the 
commissioner did. For the most part, this evidence in cited throughout the Benson Brief. 
On page 3, line 16, in the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "At the emergency 
room, I reported that I had twisted my right foot, landed on my right knee and foot and 
that a piece of sheet rock has landed on my left foot (R. Vol. 2 at 11,12). 
REPLY - First, that is not what I reported at the emergency room. Secondly, as 
stated in my brief, this description conflicts with the emergency room notes at (R. Vol. 2, 
page 3) which, although not detailed, is closer to what happened. Jenkins also noted that 
the x-rays showed a fracture in the right foot, but no injuries to the left foot. (R. Vol. 2 at 
12). 
REPLY - Doctor McLaughlin at the emergency room wrote the notes that Jenkins 
referenced above. However, he also wrote, "Examination of the left foot reveals minimal 
swelling if any to the dorsum of his left foot. It is tender near the cuneiform bones." (R. 
Vol. 2 at 11). Dr. McLaughlin also made out my individualized instructions for further 
care. In which he stated; "You have fractured your toe." He also stated; "Some diseases 
worsen despite proper treatment Some problems begin with unusual symptoms and 
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require time before the correct diagnosis can be made." This has been and is most 
certainly my situation. (R. Vol. 2 at 8). 
REPLY - Again, I'm sure that the Appellee would like this court to believe that 
there was only one injury caused by my on the job accident and that injury was minor and 
simple to treat. When in reality, although overlooked by the ALJ, Commission, and the 
Commissioner, there were multiple injuries, many of which were complex as shown in 
the Medical Records. 
My industrial accident occurred on October 3,1997. I saw Dr. Gordon for the 
first time on October 6,1997 at which time he wasn't satisfied with the diagnosis from 
the emergency room and/or the x-ray. He couldn't see the full extent of the injuries 
because of the extensive swelling. (R. Vol. 2 at 132). After 6 or 8 more x-rays, none of 
which were any clearer than the first one, finally, on October 23,19971 had a C.T. Scan 
at Alta View Hospital. (R. Vol. 2 at 14). On October 27,19971 met with Dr. Gordon to 
discuss the C.T. Scan report. During this process Dr. Gordon noticed even more damage 
on the C.T. Scan than what had been cited in the report. (R. Vol. 2 at 133). Refer to the 
operation report and Dr. Gordon's notes for those details. (R. Vol. 2 at 28,29, and 33). 
The C.T. Scan showed enough of the damage that Dr. Gordon finally, after almost five 
weeks scheduled surgery on November 5,1997. (R. Vol. 2 at 28). 
On Page 4, Line 5, Jenkins stated; "Benson's recovery from surgery went well 
and he was released to work on January 26,1998." (R. Vol. 2 at 140). 
REPLY - Again, I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that my 
recovery not only went well, but also did not cause me any on going problems. However, 
that was not and still is not the case as the medical evidence clearly shows. 
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I met with Dr. Gordon on November 10,1997 and he noted; "in one week I would 
like to see him back for repeat examination. Hopefully at that point he can do a sitting 
job. He understands it will be a good six to eight weeks for healing." (R. Vol. 2 at 135), 
Because of on going problems, it ended up being about 11 weeks. 
By the next visit with Dr. Gordon, a lot of the other injuries caused by the 
industrial accident had gotten much worse. Dr. Gordon notes, "At this point, he is 
complaining of as well as leg and calf cramping, numbness and tingling in his foot that 
occurs in certain positions and small amounts of pressure. He is not sleeping well at 
nighttime. He does have pain with SLR at around 45-50 degrees with increasing 
discomfort and tightness in the sciatic nerve distribution with the Laseque maneuver. 
The patient was given a prescription for Elavil 50mg g.h.s. to see if this will help with his 
sleep and pain cycle. He also was given a refill for Percocet." (R. Vol. 2 at 136). 
These problems have not only remained with me through present date but most 
have continued to get worse. These problems along with their history have been fully 
documented throughout volume 1,2, and 3 of the court records and, "although not in 
chronological order", also in volume 4 and the Benson Brief. 
On page 4, line 12, Jenkins stated; "After working for nearly a year as a 
Serialization Manager, and contrary to his doctor's restrictions, Benson accepted a 
position as an Assistant Consultant." 
REPLY - The correct title is Systems Consultant. (R. Vol. 4 at 17). The 
Serialization job had ended a couple months before I accepted the Systems Consultant 
job and I had been doing nothing at work. Dr. Gordon had given me restrictions of no 
prolonged walking (able to self adjust) and no walking or standing, desk work only. (R. 
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Vol. 3 at 382 misfiled). Dr. Gordon had also told me that, "This can take up to six 
months to a couple years for full improvement." (R. Vol. 2 at 142). It had been a year 
and a half since the accident and I wanted to see if I could get back up on my feet. As it 
turned out, like Jenkins noted, it aggravated my injuries. It also taught me something that 
Dr. Gordon told me just before surgery, something that I had been in denial of, he said; 
"The good news is, I can put you back together, the bad news is, it will never get better, it 
will only get worse and it's not a question of rather you will need more surgery but a 
question of when." 
On page 4, line 20, Jenkins stated; "Benson accepted early retirement and his last 
day of work was September 29, 2000." (R. Vol. 4 at 20). 
REPLY - I did leave the payroll on September 30, 2000 however, I was not offered 
an early retirement. My job title was given a surplus status and as I had previously 
stated, my manager, Sheryl Lodder, and I had spoken numerous times about my 
requesting a disability retirement since I was having more and more trouble with my 
injuries and because every time I complained to Dr. Gordon, he always said "get off your 
feet." (R. Vol. 4 pages 14-19). The other reason I left, was because none of the other 
jobs that were available at Lucent, met the conditions under which I worked both the 
Serialization and the Scheduling job. That being short days, and short weeks while 
drawing full time pay and benefits. (R. Vol. 1 at 183). I was terminated/laid off on the 
30th day of September, 2000. 
After leaving Lucent, I waited the customary 5 months at which time I applied for 
and received Social Security Disability effective September 30, 2000. It was approved 
because of the multitude of injuries I received from the October 3, 1997 industrial 
6 
accident. After receiving Social Security Disability, I filed for Workman's 
Compensation on June 2, 2004 for the same reason. (R. Vol. 4 at 22). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On page 6, line 1, of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "... on May 25, 2005 
Benson appealed the ALJ's decision to the Labor Commission. (R. Vol. 1 at 74). 
REPLY - I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that it was I in person 
that filed the appeal. However, it was my previous counsel Tim Allen, and not only did 
he not state a reason why the documents had not been included, he also didn't include the 
other items we had discussed that needed to be part of the appeal. This was the second 
time that he wasn't prepared or did substandard work on my case. 
On Page 6, line 5, Jenkins stated; "Lucent's memorandum in opposition to review 
argued that Lucent had never received the additional records and that I should have 
produced them before the MRE was compiled. (R. Vol. 1 at 81-82). On line 7, Jenkins 
also stated; "Lucent also noted that two of its own medical records had been excluded 
from the MRE based on timeliness objections, and argued that it would be patently unfair 
to allow me to add previously undisclosed documents to the MRE after the hearing, when 
Lucent had not been allowed to add records to the MRE that had been disclosed prior to 
the hearing." (R. Vol. 1 at 81, 82). 
REPLY - I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that these two 
scenario's are one in the same however, Lucent was fully aware that their two medical 
records were due 45 days before the hearing, yet they made no attempt to request an 
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extension of time and instead turned them in at their convenience. They were not only 
late, they were late by approximately 38 days. (R. Vol. 4 at 3). 
The other haft of this scenario, is the MRE and my request for additional records 
to be considered by the ALJ, the Commission, the Commissioner, and this court. Jenkins 
also stated, that I should have turned in all my medical records during the time frame that 
the MRE's were being compiled or during the hearing. Upon retaining my previous 
counsel, Tim Allen, he requested a copy of all my medical records. I advised him that I 
would get him all of the records used during my Social Security hearing. 
When I retrieved those records from the attorney that had handled my Social 
Security case, they were still in his binder, in chronological order and page numbered to 
meet the Social Security Administrations requirements. I reviewed them for accuracy 
and completeness, copied them page by page and gave them to Tim Allen. I gave tin 
copy to Tim during May of 2004, and they still had the page numbers on them from 
Social Security. Shortly after that, I was asked to sign about a dozen authorization forms 
for medical records. This was requested by the Appellee, and this I did. Then during 
October 2004,1 was asked, per a request from the Appellee, via my counsel to sign an 
authorization for them to get my employment records from Avaya. After that I didn't 
hear anymore about records from anybody. 
The first time I saw the MRE, was a few minutes before the hearing on April 21, 
2005. I asked my counsel what they were and after being told, I asked where they came 
from and why I hadn't had a chance to review them. He told me that Mark Anderson, the 
counsel for the Appellee, had compiled them and that it wasn't necessary to review them 
because it would be an open and shut case since the Appellee wouldn't have any 
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evidence. I didn't have an opportunity to review those records until after the ALJ had 
handed down her decision from the bench and closed the hearing. 
In my Brief, on page 5, lines 5 - 7,1 made note that (R602-2-l(Hl) states: "the 
parties are expected to exchange medical records during the discovery period." After this 
note, I stated; "It is my contention that this never occurred." Because of this statement, I 
apologize to Mr. Anderson, the Commission, and this court. That being said, raises the 
following question. In the MRE, volume 2, pages 216 - 221, on the lower right hand 
corner of each page, there are hand written numbers next to the typed page numbers for 
the MRE. Those written numbers are the numbering that meets the requirements of the 
Social Security Administration. Because there are only 6 pages in the MRE that have this 
numbering, I wonder where the other 100 plus pages are with the same numbering. 
The evidence shows that Mr. Anderson requested a copy of my Social Security 
records from them. (Benson Brief, Addendum G). Based on the condition of the MRE, 
and the fact that many of the missing/new pages of evidence that are included in my 
Request for Reconsideration also have the same numbering on them, I must wonder if the 
medical records that were included in the MRE were hand selected. Otherwise, I find it 
to be rather suspicious and somewhat odd that there are not more pages in the MRE that 
show that hand written numbering system from the Social Security Administration. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On page 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Benson's contention that the 
MRE was flawed as a whole due to organizational errors fails because the mere misfiling 
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of records in the MRE, without a showing that the misfilings prejudiced Benson, is not 
sufficient to invalidate the MRE." 
REPLY - Jenkins may want this court to believe that the MRE is understandable as 
it is by referring to the disastrous, disorganized condition of the MRE as "organizational 
errors... mere misfiling of records", when in fact, there is little if any organization in 
them at all. Again, as previously noted in the Benson Brief, on page 6, Rule R602-2-
1(H4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical 
provider in chronological order and bound." 
REPLY - The problem with the lack of chronological order begins on the first page 
of the MRE, the Records Index. It is my contention that it is impossible for anyone to 
find, let alone understand all of my injuries and/or understand the treatment history 
without being able to start by knowing which doctor/institution was seen first. The only 
records, regardless of whether it's a doctor and/or a medical institution listed on the 
Records Index that is in its correct order, is number 1, Alta View Hospital; number 3, 
Canyon Sports Therapy; number 11, Jeff Chung, M.D. (ALJ excluded) and; number 12, 
Dell C. Felix, P.T. (ALJ excluded). The following list will show the order in which they 
are shown now and the order in which they should be shown. 
Present 
tab No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Alta View Hospital 
John P. Barbuto, M.D. 
Canyon Sports Therapy 
Alan L. Colledge, M.D. 
Anthony G. Gordon, M.D. 
Registered Physical Therapists 
Michael A. Schreiner, Ph.D. 
First date 
seen 
10-03-97 
02-13-02 
03-31-98 
12-03-01 
10-06-97 
05-03-00 
03-05-02 
Correct 
tab No. 
1 
8 
3 
7 
2 
5 
9 
10 
8 University of UT. Pain Management Center 05-10-02 10 
9 Randy Watson, M.D. 09-29-98 4 
10 Gary R. Zeluff, M.D. 05-25-00 6 
11 Jeff Chung, M.D. (ALJ disallowed) 03-29-05 11 
12 Dell C. Felix, P.T. (ALJ disallowed) 04-04-05 12 
On page 8, line 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Benson also argues that 
the ALJ and the Labor Commission should have submitted the question of causation 
concerning his left knee injury to a medical panel because there were conflicting medical 
opinions regarding causation. However, the ALJ and the Commission were correct in not 
convening a medical panel because the cause of Benson's left knee injury was irrelevant 
due to the fact that he had failed to prove that he was totally disabled. Additionally, the 
ALJ did not abuse her discretion by failing to analyze all of the issues surrounding 
Benson's claim for benefits once she determined that his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits had failed." 
REPLY- Although I have raised the question about causation concerning my left 
knee, it is my contention that the records in the MRE clearly prove that my left knee is in 
fact, one of the injuries that was caused by my accident on October 3, 1997. This as well 
as other injuries are documented in the MRE and the Benson Brief on pages 13-31. As 
an example, page 13 noted as tab 1 - pg 3, page 15 noted as tab 5 - pg 131, page 17 
noted as tab5 - pg 149, page 17 noted as tab 5 - pg 150, etc., etc.,. These are only a few 
of the notes on my left leg, foot and knee. 
Had the ALJ been more thorough when she reviewed the MRE, she would have 
already been aware that my left knee injury was in fact one of the many injuries that I 
received on October 3,1997. If there is a question for a medical panel, I believe it would 
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be how much damage would 1200 to 1500 hundred pounds of commercial grade 
sheetrock do to something as fragile as the human body when it lands on it. 
ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should find that the MRE is completely lacking any kind of 
chronological order and that it is complied in such a poor manner that it in no way meets 
the requirements in Rule R602-2-l(H4). Secondly, this Court should also find that the 
MRE is in such disarray that it would be impossible to determine the extent of all of my 
injuries and there medical history. Additionally, the fact that there are so many important 
medical documents, documents that I have provided to Commissioner Ellertson, that are 
missing in the MRE, it would make it impossible for the ALJ to make an informed 
decision based on all of the medical evidence. However, by doing so, the ALJ has caused 
a substantial injustice. 
On page 9 of the Appellee's Brief, Jenkins raised two issues with my Brief. First, 
he stated; "where a Briefs overall analysis is so lacking that it shifts the burden of the 
research and argument to the court... Benson's Brief is devoid of almost any relevant 
legal analysis ... arguments are largely bald assertions ... brief is structured in such a 
way that it requires the reader to guess at the topics he addresses and the arguments he 
makes. Secondly,... it is Lucent's understanding that Benson has not directly challenged 
any of the Commission's findings of fact other than its finding that there were not 
significant conflicting opinions concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury. 
12 
Benson failed to marshal evidence as required to challenge a finding of fact.... Benson 
has not even attempted to marshal the evidence." 
REPLY- In response to Jenkins two issues. First, I'm sure that my Brief is not 
organized as well as the average attorney's however, I made a good faith effort trying to 
organize it in a manner that I believe this court will find that it does not shift the burden 
of research and argument to the court. Furthermore, I believe that this court will find that 
it is not devoid of relevant legal analysis and that my arguments are not bald assertions. 
Secondly, I believe that this court will in fact find that I have challenged the ALJ's 
findings of fact, not only my left knee but everything that the ALJ included in her 
findings of fact. In my brief, on page 12,1 referenced my response/marshaling of the 
evidence to my Request for Reconsideration document. In my brief, I referenced the 
following rules and statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413 Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420(l) 
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-601 Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-801(1997) 
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-802(l) Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(a)-changed to 
34A-2-601 Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(9)-changed to 
34A-2-601 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8(2) Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-14 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures, Title II, Rule 11, (b)(1)(c) 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9 - changed to R602-2-2 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A4) Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A5) 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A6) Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(Hl) 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H2) Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H3) 
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H4) Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2 
All of these statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in Addendum A. 
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POINT 1 
A - Heading 
On page 11, line 12 of the Appellee Brief, under the heading of Point 1, Jenkins 
stated; "The Commission's reliance on the medical records exhibit was not an abuse of 
discretion because any omissions in the records were caused by Benson's own failure to 
include documents he had in his possession long before the evidentiary hearing." 
REPLY - I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that I and I alone am 
to blame for all of the records that are missing in my MRE. However, as previously 
stated, and as required by R602-2- 1(H)(2), "... petitioner shall submit all relevant 
medical records contained in his/her possession ... ." 
I provided a complete copy of all the medical records that were used by my 
counsel for Social Security Disability to my previous counsel for this case, Tim Allen, so 
that he could exchange records with the respondent as required by R602-2- 1(H)(1). 
These copies had been page numbered to meet the requirements of the Social Security 
Administration. 
R602-2- 1(H)(3) states; "... The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record 
exhibit containing ALL RELEVANT MEDICAL RECORDS ... ALL RELEVANT 
TREATMENT RECORDS THAT TEND TO PROVE OR DISPROVE A FACT IN 
ISSUE... ." 
REPLY - It is my contention, as proven by the additional medical records thai I have 
provided in my Request for Review, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and, this 
Reply to the Respondent's Brief, that this requirement was not met. 
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R602-2- 1(H)(4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, 
arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and bound." 
REPLY - There is no chronological order of the medical care providers and it is my 
contention that there is little if any chronological order of the medical record pages them 
self. 
R602-2- 1(H)(5) states; "... Late-filed medical records may or may not be 
admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good cause 
shown. 
REPLY - I'm sure that with the evidence I've shown, this court will agree that I 
have shown good cause and therefore, the additional records should be considered as 
additional proof that I am qualified for permanent total disability and therefore should 
receive those benefits. 
On page 12, line 17 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "... Benson has not 
shown good cause to allow additional records to be admitted." 
REPLY - It is true that my previous counsel, Tim Allen, did not cite any reasons of 
good cause when he prepared my Request for Review. That's another example of the 
poor representation that he had provided to me. However, beginning with the Request for 
Reconsideration, which I prepared myself, it is my contention that this court will find that 
I in fact have shown good cause. 
On page 12, line 18 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "He provided a number 
of records to Lucent previous to the evidentiary hearing, all of which were incorporated 
into the MRE." 
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REPLY - As previously stated, I did provide my previous counsel with a complete 
copy of the medical records that were used for my Social Security Disability case, those 
records still had the page numbering on them that was required by the Social Security 
Administration. However, if as Jenkins stated, that all of those records were incorporated 
into the MRE, why didn't the vast majority of the pages in the MRE still show the page 
numbering that was required by the Social Security Administration. As an example, see 
(R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221) at the lower right hand corner of the page. 
On page 14, line 2 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Clearly, Lucent fulfilled 
its statutory duty to complete the MRE and then submitted it to Benson for his 
inspection." 
REPLY - It is my belief that this court will find that this statement is not only false, 
but also misleading. It is my contention that Lucent did not fulfill their duty to compile 
the MRE because it does not contain all of my medical records, it has no chronological 
order and is therefore impossible to understand. Additionally, as previously stated, I'm 
sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that he submitted a copy of the MRE 
directly to me however, the fact is that he had it delivered to my previous counsel, Tim 
Allen, and that's where it stopped. I never saw it until a few minutes before the hearing. 
On page 14, line 10 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Finally, it would be 
patently unfair to allow Benson to include additional documents in the MRE after he had 
successfully petitioned the ALJ to exclude Lucent's expert reports for violating similar 
technical timing requirements." 
REPLY - It is my belief that this court will see that the only similarity between the 
ALJ excluding Lucent's reports and my request to include additional documents is that 
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Lucent/Anderson/Jenkins were the only direct cause of both situations. Lucent was 
aware of the 45 day requirement and had the option of requesting an extension of time, 
which they apparently choose not to do. It was also Lucent's/Anderson/Jenkins 
responsibility to compile the MRE based on the guide lines set down by the rules of the 
Labor Commission which, apparently they also choose not to do. 
It is for these reasons, that I, the petitioner, ask this court to find that the ALJ, the 
Commission and, the Commissioner did in fact abuse its discretion by not reviewing the 
additional documents that I have provided to them after the evidentiary hearing. These 
documents included statements showing good cause. 
B • Heading 
On page 14, line 17 of the Appellee Brief, under Category B, Jenkins stated; "The 
Medical Records Exhibit Did Not Include Any Significant Omissions." On line 20, 
Jenkins stated; "... even if this decision were improper, it would be immaterial to the 
denial of Benson's permanent total disability claim because the MRE did not include any 
significant omissions." On page 15, line 1, Jenkins stated; "Benson criticizes the MRE 
for being incomplete and it appears that the focus of his argument is the 58 pages of 
documents he attached to his Request for Reconsideration to the Commissioner. (R. Vol. 
1 at 96). 
REPLY - First, had Jenkins reviewed the court records and/or the Benson Brief 
closer, he would have found that there are 71 pages instead of 58. (R. Vol. 1 at 113 -
183) (Benson Brief, page 27, line 18). Secondly, I'm sure that Jenkins would like this 
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court to believe that those 71 pages are the only problem with the MRE. Lastly, the MRE 
as it is now, contains 535 pages. If the 303 pages of duplicates and/or junk pages were to 
be removed, that would leave 233 pages of actual medical records. If the 71 missing 
pages were added to the MRE, that's over 20% of the total record, there would be 355 
pages of reliable medical records. Those 71 pages therefore play an important role in my 
claim for permanent total disability. However, as noted throughout my Request for 
Reconsideration, my Brief and, this Reply Brief, there are hundreds of other problems in 
the MRE that combined with the missing documents are the cause of my being denied 
permanent total disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 96 -111) (Benson Brief, pages 7, 13 - 33). 
On page 15, line 3, Jenkins stated; "Many of the documents in question are not 
appropriate for the MRE, given that they are correspondence, bills, and other documents 
that are not "medical records." 
REPLY - It is my contention that anything written by a doctor that has anything to 
do with the injury/illness, rather it be a note in the medical file, a correspondence 1o the 
insurance carrier, the employer or whoever, is a medical document and therefore should 
be in the MRE. It is also my contention, that any medical bills generated because of the 
injury/illness, and tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue are also medical documents 
and therefore, should be in the MRE. It is also my belief that this court will agree with 
this statement. 
On page 15, line 7, Jenkins stated; "... the additional documents do not change 
the basic facts that are already set forth in the MRE." On line 15, Jenkins stated;"... the 
records Benson seeks to add are merely redundant." 
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REPLY - It is my contention, and 1 believe that this court will agree, tl lat the 
additional documents do in fact change the facts that are in the MRE. They are not 
duplicates, they show new and different evidence and, they provide a complete picture of 
all my injuries (here treatment history and therefore, can not be redundant. 
On page 15, line 18, Jenkins stated; "... the additional records do not address the 
reasons that the A! J at id 1 1 ic Coi i in lissioi i cited wl lei i dei i> i:t ig Bei ison's reqi lest for 
benefits." 
REPLY - It is my belief that aftei tl lis con u t i eviews all of th z s\ idence. it will In id 
that I have in fact addressed all of the reasons the ALJ cited to deny my request for 
benefits. As an example, the ALJ stated that I only had one restriction, no prolonged 
walking, when in fact, there are numerous restrictions. (R. Vol. 1 at 113)(R. Vol. 2 at 
150)(R Vol. 3 at 382 - misfiled). 
On page 15, line 19, Jenkins stated; "The ALJ held that Benson had not proved 
that he was unable to perform his former work as a scheduler, that he had not proved that 
he was iiiiaNe li1 pcifoim olh< i \\ml In1 li.nl mil privr-l lh.il In, iii<lnslii,iil iitYiilnil 
was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. These holdings were based largely 
on the fact that he was able to perform., his job duties for se\ eral y ears before leaving 
Lucent, that he only left Lucent once he was offered early retirement..." 
REPLY - It is true that I did return to work. However, it was only for 35 months 
instead of several years. It is my contention that the ALJ completely ignored my 
testimony in regards to my not working 8 hour days or 40 hour weeks. (R Vol. 4, page 
32, lines 1-16). Had the ALJ and/or the Commissioner reviewed the documents that I 
had requested to be added as new medical documents in my Request for Reconsideration, 
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they would have found additional proof that I can not work a normal 8 hour day or a 40 
hour week. (R. Vol. 1 at 113, 183). Once all the evidence has been reviewed by this 
court, it is my contention that the court will support the fact that I have proven that the 
industrial accident was the direct cause of my permanent total disability and, had the ALJ 
taken the time that my MRE requires in order to be understood, instead of being in such a 
hurry to hand down her decision from the bench, which she did, she would have handed 
down a much different decision. Additionally, had the ALJ and/or Ihe Commissioner 
reviewed the additional documents that I had requested to be added to the MRE, they 
would have found additional evidence that the accident was the direct cause of my 
permanent total disability. (R. Vol. 3 at 490, 492, 493)(R. Vol. 2 at 114 - misfiled, 115 — 
misfiled, 112 - misfiled, 111 - misfiled, 109 - misfiled, 107 - misfiled, 103 - misfiled, 
98 - misfiled, 94 - misfiled). 
During the 35 months that I worked after the accident, as the evidence clearly 
shows, my injuries continually got worse. I was always on a mix of multiple pain killers, 
anti-inflammatories and a variety of other medications for nerve pain, infections, sleep, 
sweating, etc., etc.. (R. Vol. 1 at 115-127)(R. Vol. at 226-245). As further proof that the 
accident did cause my permanent total disability, there are numerous statements from Dr. 
Watson that prior to the accident, there is no history of any of the medical problems that 
I've had since October 3,1997 to the current date. (R. Vol. 1 at 141,170,172, 173,174, 
175, 177, 178, 179, 180, and 181). 
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B - Heading 
On page 16, line 20, Jenkins stated; "The Commission's reliance on the MRE was 
not an abuse of discretion despite the record's organizations : >lems. 
REPLY - Rule 602-2-1(H)(4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed, 
paginated, arranged by medical provider in chronological order and bound." I believe 
that this court will agree with me as to my understanding of what the about rule means. I 
believe that it means, indexed and paginated means tabbed and page numbered and the 
remainder means that the medical prm ider/institutioii shcii ild be listed by first date seem, 
in chronological order, and that the pages should be arranged by the date seen, in 
chronological order. Because of the ah i lost complete lack of organization in (he MRE, 
and the fact that there are so many missing medical records, this court should find that the 
ALJ and the Commissioner did in fact abuse their discretion by relying on the MRE as 
they are. (Benson Brief, page 6, lines 3,4). 
On page 17, line 2, Jenkins stated; "... he has not demonstrated that these error's 
affected how the Labor Commission decided his case." 
REPLY - After reviewing my Request for Reconsideration and my Brief, I believe 
that this coinl u ill ugiiv liial ( hdvv in tail slmwii fii.ii tIn • iiintless errors have been the 
cause of an undeniable negative effect on how the Labor Commission decided my case. 
On page 1 ] , lint ic 9. let ikil is stated;' xBei ison 1 las not cited ai :n ' law suggesting that 
the misfilings in an MRE in and of them selves invalidate the entire record." 
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REPLY - I may not have cited a law that covers that specific verbage. However, I 
did cite the rule governing the MRE, its content and how it should be arranged. (Benson 
Brief, page 6, lines 3, 4). 
On page 17, line 11, Jenkins stated: "... he has not cited any evidence indicating 
that the ALJ or the Commission had any difficulty navigating the MRE." 
REPLY - As a small example, that this is another false statement. On page 24, line 
12 of the Appellee's own Brief, Jenkins stated; "Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own medical 
expert...." It seems that if the ALJ, the Commission and Jenkins didn't have any 
problems navigating the MRE, they would have known that Zeluff was not my medical 
expert but instead, a doctor that was in fact provided by the Appellee. (R. Vol. 3 at 422, 
423 misfiled). Additionally, I am sure that as this court reviews my Request for 
Reconsideration, my Brief, and this Reply Brief, it will notice dozens of other exaimples 
and will find that the ALJ, the Commission and, Jenkins have had lots of trouble trying to 
navigate the MRE. 
On page 17, line 16, Jenkins stated; "Without evidence that he was somehow 
prejudiced by the misfilings, or that the Commission missed important evidence due to 
the misfilings, they cannot be viewed as anything more serious than unfortunate but 
inconsequential mistakes that did not affect the outcome of the case." 
REPLY - After this court reviews the MRE, my Request for Reconsideration, my 
Brief, and the Reply Brief, I'm sure that this court will find that there was so much 
important evidence that had been misfiled, overlooked and/or missing, that the ALJ 
and/or the Commissioner made a grave error when they denied by request for benefits 
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and refused to review/consider all of the new/missing evidence that I had requested lo Ix 
considered therefore, they abused their discretion. 
On page 17, line 21, Jenkins stated; "The mere fact that organizational errors exist 
in the MRE is i i validate the exhibit, and without evidence of a negative 
effect on Benson's claim, there is no reason to assume that the Commission abused its 
discretion by relying 01 1 tl t :,:: I\ IRE despite its ii i ^ perfections." 
REPLY - It is my belief that this court will agree with me that the only evidence that 
is needed to show a negative affect on my claim, is the fact that my claii11 v\ as denied. 
Based on all the evidence that I've presented in the MRE, my Request for 
Reconsideration, my Brief and this Reply Brief, this court should find that the ALJ, the 
Commission and, the Commissioner did abuse their discretion. 
D - Head ing 
On page 18, line 9 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "The record shows that 
the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission reviewed ai id t iiiciei stood the 
medical records." Additionally, on line 15, Jenkins stated; "Benson has not cited a single 
piece of evidence that suggesting that the ALJ or the Commission failed to properly 
review the evidence." 
REPLY - After reviewing all of the evidence that I have provided in the MRE, my 
Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and, this Reply Brief, I believe that this court will 
find that the above two statements are false. Furthermore, on page 18, line 21, Jenkins 
stated; "... the Commissioner stated tl lat I le denied Bensoi I'S claii i I because '"tl le n ioi: e 
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persuasive evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr. Benson is 
not permanently and totally disabled.'" (R. Vol. 1 at 86). Again, after reviewing all of 
the evidence that Fve presented, Fm sure that this court will find that the more persuasive 
evidence shows that I am in fact permanently and totally disabled and that this condition 
was caused by my industrial accident on October 03, 1997. 
On page 19, line 12, Jenkins stated; "She also addressed other considerations, 
such as Dr. Barbuto's determination that Benson had '"obvious pain behaviors of a 
psychosocial type"' accompanied by '"frequent wincing and melodrama in his 
movements.'" (R. Vol. 1 at 69). 
REPLY - According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, American Edition, 
printed by Oxford University Press in 1996, the definition of psychosocial is; "of or 
involving the influence of social factors or human interactive behavior." The definition 
of wincing or wince is; "a start or involuntary shrinking movement showing pain or 
distress." Lastly, the definition of melodrama is; " l a sensational dramatic piece with 
crude appeals to the emotions and usu. A happy ending. 2 the genre of drama of this type. 
3 language, behavior, or an occurrence suggestive of this. 4 hist, a play with songs 
interspersed and with orchestral music accompanying the action." It appears that Dr. 
Barbuto may be straying outside the limits of his medical license, which is in the practice 
of Neurology not Psychology. 
The following is a list of all the medications that Fve been required to take every 
day, some of them once, some twice and, some of them three times a day, the brands and 
names have changed since October 3,1997, but never the less, in one form or another, 
Fve taken them since the accident. Those medications are; Lexapro, Robibul, Tricor, 
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Zetia, Ultram, Baclofen, Mobic, Neurontin, Keflex, Lotensin, Mirapex, Requip and, 
Zyrtec. Of these medications, Zyrtec, or another medication in the same category, was 
the only one of these medications that I use to take on a seasonal basic, because of 
seasonal allergies. Soi i le of tl ic many side affects tl ml these medications ha • that 
they always upset my stomach, they speed up my metabolism, therefore I 'm always 
hungry and, they make me shake worse and differentl) tl i.a i tl ic si v< ikes tl i.at < ti e cause d by 
pain. If I were to eat whenever I was hungry, which I do more than I should, Fd be 
heavier than I am now, which is approximately 20 pounds more than I weighted before 
the accident. Therefore, it is my belief that that may be why Dr. Barbuto, thinks that, 
some of my shaking, was caused by what he called melodrama. It is true that I shake 
because of the pain, and it is also true that I shake worse because I 'm hungry and 
somewhat weak. However, it is my belief that unless a doctor had been treating me for 
some time, they won ild i lot be aware of that fact. Therefore , it is h] r contentioi 1 that a 
doctor, like Dr. Barbuto, that only saw me for about 15 minutes on one occasion, could 
determine what he stated. 
On March 05, 2002,1 had an appointment with Dr. Michael A. Schreiner, Ph. D. 
who is a Clinical Psychologist, he didn't draw any of the same conclusions that Barbuto 
did and I do believe that he is much more qualified in his field than Barbuto who is 
practicing Neurology. My appointment with Dr. Schreiner was at the request of the 
Social Security Administration for an independent evaluation. (R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221). 
Therefore, based on the evidence that I've provided this court in reference to Dr. 
Barbuto. this cent n I si 101 ild coi isidei his i epoi 11 :> be i ini eliable ai id tl lerefore strickeii froi n 
the record. I would also request this court find that the ALJ, the Commission and, the 
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Commissioner did in fact abuse its discretion while reviewing the MRE and interpreting 
the evidence in it. 
POINT 2 
A, B & C - Heading 
On page 20, line 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "The Administrative Law 
Judge and Labor Commission did not abuse their discretion by not submitting the; case to 
a medical panel." On line 16, Jenkins stated; "He believes this error was either caused by 
missing/overlooked documents in the MRE ...." In support of these two statements, on 
page 24, line 5, Jenkins stated; "Benson's entire argument concerning the necessity of a 
medical panel arises from a paragraph in the ALJ's findings of fact in which she states 
that Dr. Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee 
condition. (R. Vol. 1 at 69). It relies entirely on notes Dr. Gordon took concerning an 
office visit Benson made in July of 2000. The disagreement concerning the cause of 
Benson's left knee condition is not significant, ... Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own 
medical expert...." On line 16, Jenkins also stated; "... the document upon which 
Benson relies to claim a significant difference of opinion concerning causation is a brief 
memo in Dr. Gordon's records detailing Benson's office visit on July 27, 2000. The 
doctor's note states that '" at this point, it appears that he has as irritation of the left knee 
probably aggravated from the abnormal gait from his right foot injury. Would 
recommend getting an MRI of the left knee to rule out a lateral meniscus tear." (R. Vol. 2 
at 157). 
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On page 24, line 22, Jenkins stated his personal opinions as follows; "This 
document was clearly not meant as a statement of Dr. Gordon's opinion concerning the 
cause of Benson's left knee injury, nor was it a medical report. Rather, it is a brief memo 
meant for Benson's fill • r. oordon of what was discussed during Benson's 
visit. His statement that '"at this point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee 
probably aggravated fi 01 :t i tl le i igl it foot ii lji it ) " " is i lot language that suggests an 
opinion concerning causation, but rather appears to be a vague hypothesis procedure." 
On page 25, line 7, Jenkins further stated; "Given the nature of the document and 
the extremely vague language that related Dr. Gordon's "'opinion,'" the ALJ acted both 
reasonably and rationally by determining that Dr. Gordon's office note did not create a 
significant conflicting opinion in the face of Dr. Zeluff s clearly stated opinion contained 
in the medical report. As such, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by ruling on the 
question of causation \ \ it! i the assistance of ait i ledical panel.'' 
REPLY - As shown in the MRE, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and, 
this Repl> Br ief to the \ j i i n Ii icii isti ial '"\ ccident was 3i:ie that clearlj caused 
multiple injuries. Therefore, it is my contention that since the ALJ only recognized one 
injury, my right foot, she did not review my entire MRE. As cited in the Benson Brief, 
page 8, line 6, in the Willardson case, the court stated; ". . . allowing the ALJ, who has no 
medical training and prossesses no medical degrees, to determine medical causation as a 
threshold question ... effectively eviscerates the beneficence of subsection (a)." 
Furthermore, it is my contention that since, as the evidence proves, my accident involved 
multiple injuries, not just my right foot, and since the VI J I n is 1 u id i IO i nedic al ti aining 
and therefore, most likely can not comprehend the amount of damage that 1200 to 1500 
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pounds of commercial grade sheetrock can do when it impacts something as fragile as the 
human body. 
Because this Industrial Accident caused multiple injuries and because there is 
almost ten years of treatment history, which has caused it to become very paper intensive 
and therefore complex, there is only one way that this case can be understood. That 
being, all of my medical records must be reviewed, not just the ones in the MRE, and the 
records must be in chronological order. The evidence proves that it is a complex, 
multiple injury case. (Benson Brief, pages 13 - 27). The evidence also proves that there 
was no history of any injuries/medical problems, except an occasional allergy/sinus 
problem, before the Industrial Accident on October 03,1997. (Benson Brief, pages 28 -
31)(R. Vol. 2, page 127, line 33). 
My left leg, knee and foot have been documented every since the Industrial 
Accident on October 03, 1997, starting at the Alta View Hospital Emergency Room. 
(Benson Brief, pages 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, etc., etc.,)(Benson Brief, page 15, tab 5). 
As previously mentioned, Jenkins stated; "Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own 
medical expert, ..." (Appellee Brief, page 24, line 12). Mr. Jenkins erred by making that 
statement and had he been more thorough, while reviewing the MRE, he would have 
known that my appointment with Dr. Zeluff, was scheduled by Gates McDonald, the 
insurance carrier at the time, for the purpose of an independent medical evaluation. (R. 
Vol. 3 at 420-424). 
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D - Heading 
Under the D - Heading, on pages 25, 26 and, 27, Jenkins stated; "Benson has not 
proved that his sleep problems or cognitive difficulties are related in any way to his left 
knee injury. ... his sleep problems are caused by '"nervous legs."' A condition that 
makes both of his legs "'flip uncontrollably'" at night. He has made various vague 
statements suggesting tl mat 1 lis i ien oi is legs are related to 1 lis left ki i x injui > , but has it: l ::it 
presented any medical evidence demonstrating a connection between his twitching legs 
and 1 lis left knee injury. ... 1 le has not si tow i 11 low or w 1 i> 1 lis lef I knee injury could have 
caused nervous leg syndrome in both of his legs." 
Lastly, Jenkins stated; "Benson testified that he has been on " 'dozens and 
dozens ' " of different medicat ion 's . ... he has not specified which medications he believes 
caused his cognitive problems, nor has he submitted any medical evidence to prove that 
his cognitive difficulties are a result of any of the dozens of i iiedications he has been on, 
or that any such medications were necessitated by his left knee injury. In the end, the 
cause of Benson 's left ki lee • inji n > is totally ii i elevant ..." 
REPLY - I don ' t know where Mr. Jenkins got the idea that any of my problems were 
caused I: ;; < n n lei t knee, I certainly ha\ en ' t n tade that statemei it I he e\ idence clearly 
shows that along with my left knee, all of my injuries and medical problems were all 
caused by the industrial accident. Fm sure that Mr. Jenkins would like this court to 
believe that all of my injuries/medical problems all happened at different times and 
therefore are not to be considered as being a part of my industrial accident however, as 
the preponderance of substantial evidence clearly show s, tl ie> were all cai ised bj ( 1 it: 
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accident on October 03, 1997. As noted by the Alta View Hospital Emergency Room, 
Dr. Gordon, Dr. Watson, and others, both my legs and feet were impacted, twisted and/or 
crushed by the 1200 to 1500 pounds of sheetrock. This impact caused breaks, 
dislocations, swelling, ligament and tissue damage, nerve damage/numbness/pain, 
circulatory and bruising damage and other problems. It also caused the beginning of my 
sleep problems which were first noted by Dr. Gordon on November 17, 1998. (Benson 
Brief, page 15). The nerve damage/nervous legs/nervous leg syndrome/flipping legs, leg 
and calf cramping, and sweating, etc., etc., problems were also caused by the accident. 
Between October 03, 1997 and December 16, 1998 (my first impairment rating), 
Kendra Hefner who was the Authorized Benefit Delegate for the Disability Management 
group with Lucent Technologies and was my contact person after every doctor's visit, 
asked me almost every time I contacted her, "you sound depressed, are you alright?" 
Between January 28,1998 (my return to work date) and June 10, 1999, my physical 
condition as well as my mental condition steadily declined, I was not getting any better. 
While I was at an appointment with Dr. Watson, he diagnosed me as showing signs of 
depression, stress, and anxiety. (R. Vol. 3 at 484). On June 18, 1999, he stated; 
"Depression which is reactive." (R. Vol. 3 at 486). On June 15,1999, he stated; (He has 
been suffering from depression related to his previous on the job injury." (R. Vol. 3 at 
485). 
Additionally, I was scheduled to see Michael A. Schreiner, Ph. D. (Clinical 
Psychologist) by the Division of Disability Determination Services of the Social Security 
Administration on March 05, 2002, for the possible problems of depression and anxiety. 
This was an independent medical evaluation. (R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221). Dr. Schreiner 
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stated in his report; "It is deemed by this examiner that Mr. Benson appears to be 
struggling with a dysthymic-type of depression - that being chronic, mild depression, 
rather than a major depressive disorder at this time. The depression is also related to his 
injuries in ii - is not sleeping at night due to physic .al paii 1 ai id does not engage in 
previously enjoyed activities due to the pain." (R. Vol. 2, page 220, lines 8 - 14). 
. Prior to being released I i oi i i tl te ei i lei gei icj ' rooi n oi :i Octobei 03, 199 5 , Dr. 
McLaughlin prepared a personalized instruction sheet that I was required to read and 
sign. In those instructions, Dr. McLaughlin stated; "Some diseases worsen despite proper 
treatment. Some problems begin with unusual symptoms and require time before the 
correct diagnosis can be made." (R. Vol. 2, page 8, lines 6, 7). 
To conclude my reply to the D - Heading, although it lacks some detail, Dr. 
Watson summarized most of my injuries and medical problems that were caused by my 
industrial accident. (Benson Brief pages 29, 30). 1 his witl i the in n i leroi is other 
documents that Dr. Watson has written pretty much covers everything. (Benson Brief, 
pages 24, 29, 30)(F \ < 1 1 | « ig< : , 1 
181). As additional proof, in paragraph two of this document, Dr. Watson stated; "The 
history of medication prescribed by Dr. Haymes (retired) also supports Mr. Benson's 
medical history at this time." (R. Vol. 1 pages 115 - 127). 
Throughout the Appelle Brief, Mr. Jenkins has stated that this injury and that 
injury are irrelevant. However, as Fve previously stated in the Reply Brief, the evidence 
clearly shows that all of my injuries/medical problems that I've covered in my Request 
for Reconsideratior Brief, and this R epl> Brief, were it i fact cai lsed bj I i i.y iiicli isti ial 
accident. Additionally, Mr. Jenkins has stated in The Appellee Brief; " . . . the MRE did 
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not include any significant omissions." (Appellee Brief, page 14, line 22). Jenkins also 
stated; "The '"omitted"' documents largely reiterate the undisputed fact that Benson 
suffered a serious workplace injury." (Appellee Brief, page 15, lines 7, 8). Jenkins also 
stated; "The records Benson seeks to add are redundant,..." (Appellee Brief, page 15, 
lines 15, 16). "... the additional records do not address the reasons that the ALJ and 
Commission cited when denying Benson's request for benefits." (Appelle Brief, page 15, 
lines 18, 19). "None of Benson's additional documents dispute or negate the facts that 
the ALJ and the Commission relied upon in denying Benson's request for permanent total 
disability. Thus, their omission from the MRE was irrelevant and insignificant." 
(Appellee Brief, page 16, lines 11-14) . 
REPLY - It is my contention that the following evidence disproves Mr. Jenkins 
statements in the preceding paragraph. The following evidence is mostly located in (R. 
Vol. 1) and will be referred to below by page number only, 
Page 113 - Physician's Assessment of Physical Capacities prepared by Dr. 
Watson. It proves that I have more restrictions than just limited walking. 
Page 114 - Must use cane - from Dr. Gordon - supporting Dr. Watson's 
statement. (Benson Brief, page 29, lines 23, 24). It also supports (R. Vol. 1 page 183), 
the document from my last manager while at Lucent Technologies. 
Pages 115 - 127 - This is the list of prescriptions that Dr. Watson referred to as 
supporting evidence that the types of medications that I was taking prior to October 03, 
1997, were not the type required to treat any of the types of injuries and/or medical 
problems that were caused by my industrial accident. (Benson Brief, page 29). 
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Pages 1 2 8 , 1 2 9 - These are documents that proves that Dr. Zeluf f s appointment 
was scheduled by Gates McDonald , the insurance carrier at the t ime of injury, for the 
purpose of doing an independent medical evaluation. It should have been filed in the 
M R E in fii >nt < >f (R \ ; < )1 3, page 497). 
Page 130 - Is the detailed description of what happened and how it happened. It 
has been signed If i il le presents of a Notai > Pi iblic b) the c -i ily witness to the accident. It 
is the same description as (R. Vol. pages 70, 71 and Vol. 3 pages 460,461 - 462,463), 
with the exception that I added a paragraph to the beginning which addressed why Dr. 
Zeluff s report should be considered invalid and/or not credible, additionally, I added 5 
paragraphs to the end for the benefit of Pauline Dutton at Gates McDonald (the insurance 
carrier at the time). Pages 70, 71, 460, 461, 462, ai id 463 ai e all misfiled at id a re 
duplicates of each other. One of these two page records should have been filed behind 
(R. Vol. 3, page 503). 
Pages 131-137-a re documents that prove that my knee supports were being 
purchased and paid for by Gates McDonald as far back as December 11, 1997. 
Pages 138 - 140 - are documents that should have been filed in the MRE at (R. 
Vol. 2, tab 5) and (R. Vol. 2, tab 2) respectively. 
Pages 141 - 169 - are medical records/documents that should have been filed in 
the MRE at (R. Vol. 3, tab 9). 
Page 170 - is an apology letter to the Labor Commission from Dr. Watson's 
clinic manager for not sending all of my records to be included in the MRE. 
Page 171 is a cii lplicatc to page 113 s> if i ) 
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Pages 172 - 181 - these are more documents that should have been included in 
the records of Dr. Watson. 
Page 182 - are the results from Dr. Smith's tests for the EMG and NCS that Dr. 
Barbuto recommended that I have done, but refused to do himself. Additionally, because 
I had seen Dr. Barbuto and he had referred me to Western Neurological, the doctor's at 
Western Neurological refused to see anybody that had been seen by Dr. Barduto. (R. Vol. 
1 at 139).(R. Vol. 2, pages 67, 68, 69). These tests did show neurological damage to both 
legs. Dr Smith recommended that I have an MRI for my lower back. The insurance 
company, Gates McDonald, denied his recommendation. (R. Vol. 3, pages 465, 466). 
These 2 pages are duplicates with each other and are misfiled. 
Page 183 - is a document from my last manager while at Lucent Technologies 
and is further proof that I always used a cane and that I was not working full 8 hour days 
and/or full 40 hour weeks. 
To reiterate what I stated in my Request for Reconsideration, "... the Judge had 
handed down her decision from the bench,...." (R. Vol. 1 at 105). In the Respondent's 
response to my Request for Reconsideration, Mark L. Anderson stated; "The Petitioner 
criticizes the ALJ for handing down '"her decision from the bench.'" ... This statement 
is incorrect. The ALJ took the matter under advisement, and issued her Order on April 
28, 2005, which was one week after the hearing took place." 
I stand behind my statement and therefore contend that either Mr. Anderson has 
forgotten or did not tell the Commissioner the truth. That being said, the Hearing 
Transcript is not a true and accurate record of what took place in the hearing on April 21, 
2002. 
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Utah Code 34A-2-413 states that in order to qualify for permanent total disability 
I have to meet the following requirements. 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
it npairments as a result ol 1:1 le ii ldi isti ial ace i iei it oi JCCII lpatioi lal disease 
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled, 
(iii) the industrial or occupational disease was the direct cause of the 
employee's permanent total disability. 
A complete copy of this rule is in Addendum A. 
REPLY to item (i): The evidence clearly proves that I have met this 
requirement. (Appellee Brief, page 15, line 8) (R > ol 2 at 127), (R Vol 3 at 
380, 401 misfiled/duplication), (R. Vol. 3 at 477 misfiled), (R. Vol. 2 at 218 -
220), (Benson Brief; pages 13 ,14-31; -. (R * : 1 I | >ages 96 183) 
REPLY to item (ii): The evidence that was overlooked by the ALJ and the 
Commissioner in the MRE, the evidence that was included with my Motion for 
Review, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief, and this Reply Brief, clearly 
proves that I am permanently totally disabled as a result of my industrial accident. 
REPLY to item (iii): The evidence clearly proves that the industrial 
accident was the direct cause of my permanent total disability, (the same evidence 
as referenced above in the first two items). 
In summary, when this court reviews the poor condition of the MRE, and 
all of the i elevant ei idence, this coi n t shoi ild fn id tl lat the pi epondei ance of 
substantial evidence clearly proves that my industrial accident is the cause of my 
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being permanently totally disabled and therefore, I am qualified to receive 
benefits. Lastly, as stated by Dr. Watson, "It is also my opinion that he probably 
will not recover from the foot injury." (R. Vol. 1 at 180). 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the afore mentioned evidence that is included in my MRE, my 
Request for Review, my Request for Reconsideration, the Benson Brief, and this 
Reply Brief, this court should find that the ALJ abused her discretion in numerous 
ways by not rejecting the MRE because of its lack of organization and 
chronological order and by rendering her decision from the bench at the end of the 
hearing. This court should also find that the Commission and Commissioner 
abused their discretion in numerous ways by not taking corrective action upon 
being notified that the MRE did not meet their own standards, by not excepting 
the missing/new medical records after being notified of the condition of the MRE, 
and for not excepting my reasons for them not being included prior to the 
evidentiary hearing. 
Therefore, as I previously stated in my Brief, I respectfully request that 
this court not only reverse the ALJ's decision to dismiss my case with prejudice, 
but also give my request for permanent total disability compensation the final 
approval. It is my contention that because of the manner in which this case has 
been handled, there has been a substantial injustice inflicted upon myself. 
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Dated this 0 day of April, 2007. 
^ ^ ^ 7 
Jenson 
Petitioner/Appellant 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Petitioner/Appellant 
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Addendum A 
Statutes and Rules 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational 
disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee must prove by 
a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has 
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the 
employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the 
employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited 
as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent 
minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall 
be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out 
of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30,1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 
34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 
312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
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(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance 
carrier by the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's 
liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance 
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks 
of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation, 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in 
the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1,1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 
34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 
312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier 
by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 
weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received 
compensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement 
benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed 
to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to 
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably 
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under 
Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge 
shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6) 
(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under 
Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the 
employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) 
through (iii). 
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(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the 
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The 
employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of 
permanent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled 
employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage 
provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from 
Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the 
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided 
under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the 
employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of 
$500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently 
totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset 
provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset, 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, 
Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically 
appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake 
work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as 
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been 
offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the 
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge finds that the 
employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the 
record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
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(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability 
claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has 
payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final, 
unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent 
reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with 
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as 
well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent 
total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that 
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition tlie Division of Adjudication for 
a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's 
or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but tlie evidence of the 
employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be 
considered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and 
condition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable 
attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect 
to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the 
attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance 
carrier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, 
self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total 
disability compensation benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. 
Amended by Chapter 295,2006 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A02043_.Z_IP 7,823 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|All_Titles|Legislative HomeJPage 
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34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — No authority to change statutes of 
limitation — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award — Authority to approve final 
settlement claims. 
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in 
accordance with Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order 
of the commission. 
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection 
(l)(c). 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of 
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 34A-2-417, may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per 
annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, an administrative law judge shall review 
and may approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements 
under this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured settlement, or other 
appropriate payout. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A0205Q.ZIP 2,688 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this TitlejAH TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Tuesday, October OS, 2006 
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34A-2-60L Medical panel, director, or consultant — Findings and reports — Objections to 
report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case described in this 
Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrative law judge: 
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of employment for: 
(A) disability by accident; or 
(B) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability. 
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel appointed by an administrative law 
judge upon the filing of a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational 
disease. 
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a 
controverted case, the division may employ a medical director or one or more medical consultants: 
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and 
(ii) for the purpose of: 
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and 
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative law judge's ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical consultants, the medical 
director or one or more medical consultants shall be allowed to function in the same manner and under 
the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the extent 
the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; 
(ii) take an x-ray; 
(iii) perform a test; or 
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem examination. 
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the Division of 
Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require. 
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a medical 
panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or 
profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant results from the occupational disease; and 
(iii) (A) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed 
to the disability or death; and 
(B) if another cause has contributed to the disability or death, the extent in percentage to which the 
other cause has contributed to the disability or death. 
(d) (i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report submitted to the 
administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by certified mail with return receipt requested to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; and 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States 
post office, the following may file with the administrative law judge written objections to the report: 
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(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(e) (i) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding and decision on 
the report of: 
(A) a medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) one or more medical consultants. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not bound by a report 
described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary 
finding. 
(f) (i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative law judge may set 
the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. 
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may request the administrative law 
judge to have any of the following present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) the one or more medical consultants. 
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order the following to be present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) a medical consultant. 
(g) (i) The written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more medical consultants 
may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described in Subsection (2)(f). 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit under Subsection (2)(g)(i) 
may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as the report is sustained by the testimony 
admitted. 
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
established in Section 34A-2-702: 
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before 
the administrative law judge. 
(i) (i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
established in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of: 
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before the 
administrative law judge. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the employment relationship during which the 
industrial accident or occupational disease occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-
2-704(20). 
Amended by Chapter 303, 2002 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A02061.ZIP 4,637 Bytes 
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34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Procedure for review of administrative 
action. 
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier concerning a 
compensable industrial accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, any of the following 
shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employee; or 
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifications of whom are defined in rule by the 
commission. 
(b) To appeal the imposition of a penalty or other administrative act imposed by the (division on the 
employer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with this chapter or Chapter 3, Uitah Occupational 
Disease Act, any of the following shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employer; 
(ii) the insurance carrier; or 
(iii) a representative of either the employer or the insurance carrier, the qualifications of whom are 
defined in rule by the commission. 
(c) A person providing goods or services described in Subsections 34A-2-407(12) and 34A-3-108 
(12) may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-2-407 or 34A-3-108. 
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-1-309. 
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge in accordance with 
Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge on an application for hearing filed under 
Subsection (1) is a final order of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. 
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a motion 
for review with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests under Subsection (3)(c) that the appeal be heard 
by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review. 
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing the request 
with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) as part of the motion for review; or 
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days of the date 
the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be decided by the majority vote of the Appeals Board. 
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of Adjudication. Those records shall 
include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on review. 
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall make its decision in accordance with 
Section 34A-1-303. 
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings before it 
of its decision, including its findings and conclusions. 
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final unless within 30 days 
after the date the decision is issued further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, 
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against 
the commissioner or Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals 
Board. 
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a): 
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the commissioner or Appeals Board shall be made a 
party; and 
(ii) the commission shall be made a party. 
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the party has exhausted the 
party's remedies before the commission as provided by this section. 
(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commission shall certify and file with the court all 
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documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together with the decision of 
the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
Amended by Chapter 295, 2006 General Session 
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34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission — Admissible evidence. 
(1) The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law judge, or the Appeals Board, is not 
bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or 
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to 
carry out justly the spirit of the chapter, 
(2) The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence 
deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings; 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists; 
(c) reports of investigators appointed by the commission; 
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts, or other records; or 
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375,1997 General Session 
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, 
a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant 
facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt 
contains all pertinent portions of the original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within 
the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity 
to present oral or written statements at the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of 
the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect 
confidential information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary 
to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where 
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, 
except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any 
other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the 
date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued 
under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet 
the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, including the 
presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial 
court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk 
of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those 
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten the record in a trial 
court case file, with collation in the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the collated index, docket sheet, and all original 
papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of 
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, 
and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the bottom right corner of 
each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover 
page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with 
the number next following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a reference to the date on 
which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the 
paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out the record after 
pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken, 
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action 
necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record shall be 
transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. Ail of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the 
record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the 
clerk of the trial court shall include all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the 
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agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request 
from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems 
necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. 
Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court. If the 
appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format 
within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the 
appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate 
court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated 
to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant 
shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal and 
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a 
transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the 
request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional 
parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts 
and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the 
trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, 
the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and 
were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as 
are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such 
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved 
by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the 
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the 
appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of 
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is 
impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who 
may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and any objections or 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, 
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform 
to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties 
by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the 
omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The 
moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed 
changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as 
to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
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R602. Labor Commission, Adjudication. 
R602-2. Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational 
Disease Claims. 
j^SDZSZSu? Pleadings and Discovery. 
@ . Definitions. 
1. "Commission" means the Labor Commission. 
2. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the 
Labor Commission. 
3. "Application for Hearing" means the request for agency 
action regarding a workers1 compensation claim. 
M ) "Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of 
Medical Record or other medical report or treatment note completed 
by a physician that indicates the presence or absence of a medical 
causal connection between benefits sought and the alleged 
industrial injury. 
r5j "Authorization to Release Medical Records" is a form 
authorizing the injured workers1 medical providers to provide 
medical records and other medical information to the commission or 
a party. 
^6) "Supporting documents" means supporting medical 
documentation, list of medical providers, Authorization to Release 
Medical Records and, when applicable, an Appointment of Counsel 
Form. 
7. "Petitioner" means the person or entity who has filed an 
Application for Hearing. 
8. "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom the 
Application for Hearing was filed. 
9. "Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a 
motion for protective order. 
B. Application for Hearing. 
1. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by 
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests with the 
injured worker, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by 
filing an Application for Hearing with the Division. Applications 
for hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to 
Release Medical Records. 
2. An employer, insurance carrier, or any other party with 
standing under the Workers1 Compensation Act may obtain a hearing 
before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for agency 
action with the Division. 
3. All Applications for Hearing shall include any available 
supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a 
dispute over medical issues. Applications for Hearing without 
supporting documentation and a properly completed Authorization to 
Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the employer or 
insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have 
been provided. In addition to respondent's answer, a respondent 
may file a motion to dismiss the Application for Hearing where 
there is no supporting medical documentation filed to demonstrate 
medical causation when such is at issue between the parties. 
4. When an Application for Hearing with appropriate 
supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the Division 
shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application 
for Hearing, supporting documents and Notice of Formal 
Adjudication and Order for Answer. 
5. In cases where the injured worker is represented by an 
attorney, a completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form shalL 
be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention-of the 
attorney. 
C. Answer. 
1. The respondent (s) shall have 30 days from the date of 
mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer to the 
Application for Hearing. 
2. The answer shall admit or deny liability for the^claim 
and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer shall 
state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail 
that the petitioner and the Division may be fully informed of the 
nature and substance of the defenses asserted. 
3. All answers shall include a summary of benefits which 
have been paid to date on the claim, designating such payments by 
category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability, 
permanent partial disability, etc. 
4. When liability is denied based upon medical issues, 
copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support the 
denial of liability shall be filed with the answer. 
5. If the answer filed by the respondents fails to 
sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include 
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or 
contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual detail to 
support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the 
answer filed and order the respondent to file within 20 days, a 
new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule. 
6. All answers must state whether the respondent is willing 
to mediate the claim. 
7. Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application 
for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely amend the 
answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that 
would warrant the amendment. The parties shall not amend their 
pleadings later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing 
without leave of the Administrative Law Judge. 
8. Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be filed 
within ten days of service of the amended pleading without further 
order of the Labor Commission. 
D. Default. 
1. If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in 
Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default against the 
respondent. 
2. If default is entered against a respondent, the Division 
may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take evidence and 
determine the issues raised by the Application for Hearing without 
the participation of the party in default pursuant to Section 63-
46b-ll(4), Utah Code. 
3. A default of a respondent shall not be construed to 
deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured Employers1 
Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
4. The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the 
default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-46b-ll(3), 
Utah Code. The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults 
upon written and signed stipulation of all parti es to the action. 
E. Waiver of Hearing. 
1. The parties may, with the approval of the administrative 
law judge, waive their right to a hearing and enter into a 
stipulated set of facts, which may be submitted to the 
administrative law judge. The administrative law judge may use 
the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the record 
to make a final determination of liability or refer the matter to 
a Medical Panel for consideration of the medical issues pursuant 
to R602-2-2. 
2. StipuidLeu idcis silan include sufficient facts to 
address all tho issues raised in tho Apolication for Hearing and 
answer. 
3. in cases where Medical Fanei review is required, the 
administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the record, 
including hul r*ot 1 i.mited to, medical records, fact stipulations, 
radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a medical panel for 
assistance in resolving the medi ca.l issuo.s 
F. Discovery. 
1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner 
may commence discovery. Discovery allowed under this rule may 
include interrogatories, requests for production of documents, 
depositions, and medical examinations. Discovery shall not 
include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery under this 
rule shall focus on matters relevant to the claims and defenses at 
issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed continuing 
and shall be promptly supplemented by the responding party as 
information comes available. 
9
. Without leave of the administrative law judge, or written 
stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party written 
interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including all 
discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served. The 
frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for 
production of documents, medical examinations and/or depositions 
shall be limited by the administrative 1 aw judge if * is 
determi ned that: 
a. The discovery sought :i s unreasonab] y cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
b. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportun;i %- i• v 
discovery in the action to obtain the discovery sought; or 
c. The discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking 
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties1 resources, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the adjudication. 
3. Upon reasonable notice, the respondent: may require the 
petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a physician of 
the respondent's choice. 
4. All parties may conduct depositions pursuant ,.„ . 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-308, Utah Code. 
5. Requests for production of documents are allowed, but 
limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in 
the case, and shall not include requests for documents provided 
w i t h t h e p e t i tloner1s App1i c a t ion for Hearing, nor the 
respondentsf answer. 
6. Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to 
delay the adjudication of the claim. If a hearing has been 
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days 
prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative law judge 
is obtained. 
7. Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant 
documents pertaining to the discovery at issue, such as mailing 
certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The responding 
party shall have 10 days from the date the discovery motion is 
mailed to file a response to the discovery motion. 
8. Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall 
maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding 
discovery to submit in the event Division intervention is 
necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall not be 
filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to opposing 
parties. 
9. Any party who fails to obey an administrative law judge's 
discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions available under 
Rule 37f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
G. Subpoenas. 
1. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery 
proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses. All subpoenas 
shall be signed by the administrative law judge assigned to the 
case, or the duty judge where the assigned judge is not available. 
Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses shall be served 
at least 14 days prior to the hearing consistent with Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees and mileage shall be paid by the 
party which subpoenas the witness. 
2. A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the 
holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date specified 
in the subpoena as provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 
All fees associated with the production of documents shall be paid 
by th^party which subpoenas the record. 
OJ^ Medical Records Exhibit. 
£Y) The parties are expected to exchange medical records 
during the discovery period. 
(T!) Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records 
contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the 
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty 
(20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing. 
^T) The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record 
exhibit containing all relevant medical records. The medical 
record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that 
tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Hospital nurses' 
notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need 
not be included in the medical record exhibit. 
f^?^  The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged 
by medical care provider in chronological order and bound. 
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent 
shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or 
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the 
hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be admitted at 
the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or 
for good cause shown. 
6. The administrative law ^dge may require the respondent 
to submit an additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit 
in cases referred to a medical panel-
7. The petitioner is responsible L- obtaii i radiograpl is and 
diagnostic films for review by the medical panel. The 
•.administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to 
obtain radiology fi1 ms. 
1. Hearing. 
] . Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of 
record of the parties. The parties shall provide current 
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the entry 
of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at the 
hearing. 
2. Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default 
is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing by the 
parties. 
3. No later than 4 5 days prior to the scheduled hearing, all 
parties shall file a signed pretrial disclosure form that 
identifies: (1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to 
call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually 
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the parties 
intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including reports, the 
parties intend to offer in evidence at the hearing; (5) the 
specific benefits or relief claimed by the petitioner; (6) the 
specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to 
litigate; (7) whether, or not, a party anticipates that the case 
wi] 1 take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job 
categories or titles the respondents claim the petitioner is 
capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total 
disability, and; (9) any other issues that the parties intend to 
ask the administrative law judge to adjudicate. The 
administrative law judge may exclude witnesses, exhibits, 
evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any party who 
fails to timely file a signed pre-trial disclosure form as set 
forth above. The parties shall supplement the pre-trial 
disclosure form with information that newly becomes available 
after filing the original form. The pre-trial disclosure form 
does not replace other discovery allowed under these rules. 
•;>'• - 4. If the petitioner requires the services of language 
translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the obligation 
of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's 
native language and English during the hearing. If the 
respondents are dissatisfied with the proposed translator 
identified by the petitioner, the respondents may provide a 
qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense. 
5, The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to 
.outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which 
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of 
unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial disabil ity rating, 
if applicable. If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive 
medical care is sought, the petitioner shall bring documentation 
of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and the 
total mileage. 
6. The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to 
address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provid€> evidence 
to support any defenses timely raised. 
7. Parties are expected to be prepared to present their 
evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled. Requests for 
continuances may be granted or denied at the discretion of the 
administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of diligence 
in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a 
continuance. 
8. Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor 
Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the 
conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidences will be 
accepted without leave of the administrative law judge. 
J. Motions-Time to Respond. 
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall 
be filed within ten (10) days from the date the motion was filed 
with the Division. Reply memoranda shall be filed within seven 
(7) days from the date a response was filed with the Division. 
K. Notices. 
1. Orders and notices mailed by the Division to the last 
address of record provided by a party are deemed served on that 
party. 
2. Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice of 
an action by the Division served on the attorney is considered 
notice to the party represented by the attorney. 
L. Form of Decisions. 
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative 
proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, Utah Code. 
M. Motions for Review. 
1. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review 
of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by filing a 
written request for review with the Adjudication Division in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-12 and Section 
34A-1-303, Utah Code. Unless a request for review is properly 
filed, the Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of 
the Commission. If a request for review is filed, other parties 
to the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 20 
calendar days of the date the request for review was filed. If 
such a response is filed, the party filing the original request 
for review may reply within 10 calendar days of the date the 
response was filed. Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge 
shall: 
a. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after 
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence 
as may be deemed necessary; 
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order; 
or 
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801, 
Utah Code. 
2. If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental 
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a 
request for review of the same is filed. 
N. Procedural Rules. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall 
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of 
Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or ->^  m^ \/ hn nfh^rwi so modified by 
these rules. 
0. Requests for Reconsideration .niu Petil. Loris J or Judicial 
Review. 
A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for 
Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of 
final agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section 
63-4 6b-14, Utah Code. 
T2Gp%^2=25 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
^J Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of si lbmitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A, A pane] w:i]] be utilized by th< ;•< imi n i :strative Law Judge 
where one or more significant medical issues may be involved. 
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports significant medical issues are involved when 
there are: 
1. C o n f l i c t i n o m e d i <:a! • is:; r •} '.';<-] ! .:.•':- * he 
injury or disease; 
2. Conflicting medical reports ui permanent physical 
impai rment which vary more than 5% of the whole person, 
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total 
cutoff date which vary more than 90 days; 
4. Conflicting medical opinions *'^ Iat< of 
permanent total disability, and/or 
Medical expenses i n controversy amount mg i JIK-: lan 
- . .
:\ hearing oii objections . . i. panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony 
showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. Where there 
is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the 
Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the 
new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
woirker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation pertaining 
to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed -iu^ * , i 
impairment rating, and/or 
A substantial injustice may occur without such further 
Z v . i i i,, j i ' ; l i . 
b. Any expenses of the study and report; < i a medical panel 
or medical consultant and of their appearance at .. - earing, as 
well as any expenses for further medical nation or 
evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Ld, „^.i:,-.>, shall be 
paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund, as di rected by Section 
34A-2-603 
